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Abstract 
 
This paper is about the qualitatively different nature of the labour process in the 
British construction industry compared with that in Germany. The rationale of the 
British system is based on controlling costs through overseeing contract relations, 
themselves circumscribing a range of narrow, clearly defined and priced tasks. 
The production process has become secondary and production expertise restricted. 
In contrast, in Germany cost aspects are incorporated into, rather than separated 
from, the production system, built on the interaction of capital and labour and on a 
high level of production expertise. Employment relations rather than contract 
relations predominate and circumscribe a set of skills drawn from the potential of 
the labour force and dependent on broad-based vocational education.  
 
The paper is based on a detailed investigation of social housebuilding projects in 
Britain and Germany. It is the first of two papers concerned with the overriding 
cost rationale of the British construction process at the expense of considerations 
of production. The effects of this is examined here in terms of the structure of 
expertise and skills within firms, the nature of the subcontracting and the 
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composition of the construction team. The paper shows the need for more and a 
qualitatively different constellation of skills, professional and operative, in 
Britain. It thus contributes to the debate on achieving a higher skills equilibrium 
(Crouch et al. 1999; Brown et al. 2001), expands transnational sector comparisons 
(Stewart 1994) and identifies areas at which change should be directed in the UK 
construction industry, as promoted through the Latham, Egan and subsequent 
reports (Latham 1994; Construction Task Force 1998; Strategic Forum for 
Construction 2002).  
 
Abstract 267 words 
Main text excluding tables and references 6090 words 
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Introduction 
 
For the successful operation of a construction firm – and indeed the whole 
construction sector – the effective combination of cost and production knowledge 
is of paramount importance; it is also essential for any innovation (Clarke and 
Herrmann 2001). The cost function is understood as comprising all the various 
pre- and post-contract tasks, including predicting costs, estimating, buying, 
invoicing from accounts, and surveying during the whole course of a construction 
contract. Production knowledge, on the other hand, is the totality of the expertise 
and experience applied on site by the personnel of the main contractor, the 
subcontracting firms and suppliers related to bringing together labour, material 
and plant in such a way as to ensure an efficient, productive, safe, healthy and 
socially responsible process, as well as a good quality product. This distinction 
between cost and production knowledge enables the nature of firms and their skill 
base to be understood and provides an insight into the social organisation of the 
work process (Wilkinson 1983). Such knowledge is, however, organised and 
applied in very different ways in different countries, as illustrated in this paper in 
the skills and expertise within construction firms in UK and Germany.  
 
The paper draws on a study of social housing projects and the firms involved, 
altogether eight in Britain and four in Germany, for a few of which it was possible 
to obtain very detailed information.1 The comparative method applied owes much 
to that developed originally by Maurice et al. (1986) and CEREQ (1991), though  
                                                 
1 This was part of a larger study of social housing projects in Britain, Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands supported by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and 
the former Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) and entitled 
‘Standardisation and skills; a transnational study of skills, education and training for prefabrication 
in housing.’ It was conducted in partnership with researchers in each of these countries including: 
in Denmark Prof. Sten Bonke and Prof. Elsebet Frydendal Pedersen of the Technical University of 
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differs in that projects selected rather than being identical were as far as possible 
typical for their national setting, particularly with respect to the building methods 
applied. The study shows how preoccupation with costs in the British case is 
reflected in the different skill profiles of firms and is at the expenses of production 
expertise. Concomitant with the emphasis on costs in the British case is the 
preoccupation with contract rather than employment relations, as exhibited in the 
heavy reliance on subcontracting, in particular labour-only subcontracting, 
compared with Germany. This preoccupation carries through to the construction 
team, so differently constituted in the British case, as symbolised by the absence 
of the building engineer and the importance attached to the surveyor.  
Table 1 
 
In comparing the roles of those with production, technical and cost functions in 
the British and German cases and the extent to which their expertise is integrated, 
the paper seeks to develop comparative transnational research into the role of 
middle managers and engineers (Stewart et al. 1995; Winch and Campagnac 
1995). Our research has shown that the concern to control costs and contract 
relations determines all aspects of the construction process and has contributed to 
a further diminution in production knowledge and skills in British construction. A 
second and subsequent paper shows the effects this has in terms of efficiency, 
productivity and the organisation of the site process, drawing out in particular 
differences between Britain, Scotland, Denmark and Germany in labour 
deployment and the sequencing of the production process. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Denmark; in Germany Prof. Wolfgang Richter of Fachhochschule Dortmund; and in the 
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Cost and production divisions in British and German firms 
UK1 is a medium-sized firm in the north-west of England operating through two 
regional companies with 85%, or about £50m, of its work in the area of social 
housing (Table 1). The firm is unusual only in having a relatively high proportion 
of directly employed operatives, at least compared with larger firms and with 
firms in the south of England. Its turnover per employee, at £108,333 in 1998, is 
as a result much smaller than the average of £287,000 per employee for the social 
housing divisions of the two large UK contractors in our survey. These large 
contractors acted mainly as managers of the building process, with all the trades 
employed through subcontractors. They contrast with comparable-sized German 
firms, including D1 in our study, a large contractor with a turnover of £292m 
(875m DM), with about 10% of its activities in housing, one-third of this in social 
housing, and a wide regional spread over the north, east and west of the country. 
The turnover per employee of D1 is £104,353 (313,059 DM), that is, almost 
identical to the UK1 and close to the average of the four German companies 
examined. 
 
If we compare differences between manual and non-manual employment, 
especially the number of office-based staff and site staff or operatives, in these 
firms, in UK1 and D1 in particular but also in other firms in our study, some 
revealing differences are apparent. Traditionally a firm’s main skill base, 
including in the UK, was the production department; this was always the largest 
department in construction firms, responsible for all operations and production 
                                                                                                                                     
Netherlands Dr Anneke Westerhuis of CINOP. 
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personnel on site (Clarke 1992, 46-60; Gruneberg and Ive 2000). For the German 
contractors on our case study projects this remains the case; these still have large 
production departments. In contrast, the role of the UK production department has 
been generally reduced as firms have come to rely on subcontracting and have 
specialised, providing only management and supervision on site. 
 
A comparison of six of our companies, two German and four UK, highlights the 
different firm structure in the two countries (Table 2). In the German firms, office 
employees were far outnumbered by those on site: office personnel on D1 were 
15% of all employees and production personnel 85%, and on D2 21% and 79% 
respectively. Both German firms are fairly typical examples of regional 
construction firms, as apparent from this and from our previous studies of German 
firms, and carried out all the structural part (Rohbau) of the building work on the 
case studies with their own workforce (Clarke and Wall 1996 and 2000). 
Table 2 
 
For the UK companies the division of labour between office and production 
employees is quite different. UK1 is most similar to the two German companies, 
but on its case study project the UK1 contractor operated in exactly the same way 
as the other UK companies, purely managing the construction process with no 
involvement of its directly employed operatives. With the development of 
management-only firms, some UK firms have come to employ very few or no 
operatives (Winch 1998). The housebuilding divisions of the three large national 
contractors in our study, UK2, 4 and 5, for example, undertook only the 
management and supervision functions on site and had on average only 39% of all 
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employees in their production departments. A considerable proportion of site staff 
are not included in the firms’ office and production figures, as they are casually 
employed, agency labour or on short-term contracts.  
 
A closer analysis of the skills employed on UK1 reveals the predominance of the 
cost function. 58 employees or 51% of office staff, comprising those involved in 
surveying, estimating and buying, have cost-related expertise (Figure 1). In 
contrast, the German regional division did not have a commercial department at 
all; this was located at head office level with nine employees providing services 
for four regional divisions. Four employees are permanently in the estimating 
department at the regional level. The composition of knowledge in the technical 
office shows the preponderance of technical expertis, held by 20 out of 32 
personnel employed - including project management (Figure 2). The peculiarity of 
the German system of firm organisation is that surveying as a distinct function 
does not exist. It is instead integrated into the project management function in the 
domain of the building engineer, whilst estimating is traditionally placed within 
the technical and not the commercial division.  
Fig. 1 and 2 
 
A critical element accounting for the relative strength of production knowledge in 
German construction firms resides in the occupation of the building engineer, who 
provides detailed technical knowledge of the process. In the German building 
industry the building engineer is the main occupation: in 1999 6,818 building 
engineers graduated and 154,000 in total were employed in the industry, whether 
in architects’ offices, as project managers for clients or as commercial, contracts 
and project managers in firms (Statistisches Bundesamt). What is notable, in 
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contrast, for UK industry generally and the construction industry in particular is 
the lack and continuing demise of engineering knowledge (Roberts 2002). As 
expressed in dramatic terms by the Fairclough report: ‘If the current rates of 
decline were to continue into the future, the number of students in the built 
environment would rapidly collapse. By 2009 the number of applicants to civil 
engineering courses would have fallen to 0, while the last applicant to building 
and construction courses would enter university by 2012.’ (Fairclough 2002: 16) 
Present figures for construction-related degree courses show that in 2001 2,480 
students graduated in civil engineering with a first degree and 2,840 in building 
(HESA 2002). The predominance of the cost function in the UK construction 
industry is also substantiated through the membership figures of the professional 
institutions: in 2000 the Institution of Structural Engineers (IstructE) had a 
membership of 13,191 compared with 32,498 in 1998 for the quantity surveyor 
division of the RICS.  
 
The reduction in technical engineering knowledge in the UK is especially severe 
within the housebuilding sector because the product has become highly 
standardised. Engineering input is on a one-off basis from structural engineers and 
from outside, instead of being part of a firm’s technical department. This 
outsourcing has important implications for the ability of firms in Britain to change 
production methods and to innovate compared with their German and other 
European counterparts (Winch 2000; White et al. 1988). It has also gone together 
with the drive for cost reduction in large construction firms, which has seen 
production capacity largely transferred to subcontracting firms, giving them the 
central role in the organisation of construction work. 
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The role of subcontractors 
 
Heavy reliance on subcontracting in the British case is the logical outcome of this 
preoccupation with cost rather than production. Subcontracts are let out and under 
the control of the surveying department, that is the cost experts, and in 
housebuilding, particularly with the typical brick and block method of 
construction, are structured according to traditional occupations, with, for 
instance, the structural and services trades divided into groundwork, bricklaying, 
carpentry and joinery, electrical work and plumbing, which is further broken 
down into gas, water, ventilation and the fitting of sanitary ware. When the 
subcontracting firm does not have the skills or capacity to carry out the contract in 
the time period allocated in the contract programme (generally setting very tight 
targets), the trade packages are sometimes further split. In our case studies, for 
instance, the brickwork subcontract was split on both projects UK1 and 2. The 
subcontractor may also further subcontract work. The overall effect is to produce 
sharp demarcations between trade areas and to maintain traditional skill and task 
areas from which there is little escape, as any change in the system is seen to rely 
on changing contracting relations rather than centred around reorganising the 
production process itself. 
 
Subcontracting in Britain is so all-pervasive that, unlike in other countries, it 
extends to labour-only subcontracting and even to those working for 
subcontractors having contracts for services as self-employed workers rather than 
contracts of employment. Labour-only subcontracting was widespread on the case 
studies examined. So too was the use of CIS cards, a system of employment 
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subsidy only applied in construction, whereby so-called ‘self-employed’ building 
workers are issued a card by Inland Revenue and entitled to pay their own (lower 
rate) tax and insurance unless deducted at source by the contractor. The reality of 
subcontracting and in particular of labour-only-subcontracting is apparent in the 
following quotations from interviews with site managers: 
 
The system of site instruction has been put in place to deal with the huge 
labour turnover so that someone makes good and corrects mistakes. The system 
makes sure that the operatives will get paid. All subcontractors are on price 
work. 
  
All contractors have CIS cards across the board, yet they come and go. You 
never know who is there as they are moved from site to site. It depends on who 
shouts for labour. There is no continuity so they end up finishing someone 
else’s work. This is very difficult. You need only look at site instructions and 
see how these change and have increased; this is a whole file now. These can 
be given for what is already in the contract, usually with the carpenters about 
60-70%. 
 
On UK1 the total subcontract value was £3,371,571 including additional 
instructions, that is 53% of the overall contract value. Sixteen different 
subcontracting firms were employed (Table 3). Apart from subcontractor no.2 and 
3 all other subcontractors were registered with Companies House as small 
companies with a turnover of less than £1million and were thus exempt from 
reporting obligations. 
Table 3 
 
The size of the first subcontract at £1,414,971 was substantial and, including the 
brickwork package for the retaining walls and the high boundary wall, amounted 
to almost three times the value of the next biggest contract, the brickwork contract 
of £507,000 for the superstructure. The logic of the cost emphasis extends to 
splitting up the main elements of production – labour, material and machinery – 
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into separate contracts. Thus brickwork is generally contracted as labour-only, as 
on this site, with the main contractor providing the bricks. The scale of brickwork 
on this project was huge, a contract value of £969,471 split between the two 
subcontract firms No. 1 and No. 4. Subcontract firm No. 4 reported a turnover of 
£3.9m in 2000, predominantly for labour-only work and thus requiring a huge 
amount of labour, yet no figures on the numbers employed are available. On our 
site none of the bricklayers was directly employed. The other part of subcontract 
package 1, comprising strip foundations – all drainage, main drainage, street and 
house drainage – was labour and material (or supply-and-fix). This subcontract 
firm fell behind in its programme and much pressure had to be exerted to increase 
the number of operatives on site, which it eventually did by employing at the peak 
30 operatives on site for 15 consecutive days.  
 
The main characteristic of the brick-and-block low-rise building method is its low 
level of mechanisation; plant on site is minimal. On UK1 two forklifts and one 
pick-up truck were the main plant for moving and lifting materials. Forklifts 
reached the top lift of the scaffolding and served bricklayers with bricks, blocks 
and mortar and roofers with felt, battens and tiles. Mobile cranes were also 
required to lift the roof trusses into place for joiners to erect the roofs, and the 
groundwork subcontractor used excavation and loading plant for a time. The 
overall use of plant was however limited and high labour levels, especially of 
untrained labour, were in place instead, particularly on the superstructure phase. 
This was nowhere more evident than in the deployment of groundworkers on this 
site, markedly different from the situation to be observed on German sites. 
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It is ironic that a system that is in effect cost driven should, in production terms, 
appear so inefficient and labour intensive. It also gives rise to considerable 
problems, as evident again from UK1. Here, the main contractor had considerable 
difficulties regarding the groundworkers’ performance and the joiners’ 
supervision. The joinery subcontractors were labour-only subcontractors; no 
system of internal supervision and management of the joinery gangs was in place 
over a long period and 12 joiners worked many weeks without supervision, 
without a foreperson or manager to organise their work. The main contractor’s 
site manager had to step in and organise the gangs. Finally, after repeated 
requests, the joinery subcontractor put a foreperson in charge, but this was only 
for the mornings. The relationship with this subcontractor was, however, already a 
troubled one, as explained by the project manager: 
The joinery subcontracting firm was struck off the list of approved contractors 
two years ago and after much pleading the firm was given the contract. 
However, everything went wrong that could have gone wrong. The quality of 
workmanship of the 12 joiners on site varies greatly; the site manager does not 
regard the workmanship of two joiners to be acceptable and insisted that they 
would not be returning to this site after their holiday. Finally the 
subcontracting firm agreed to move the two joiners. 
 
 
The value of the labour-only subcontracts was also substantial, 42% of all 
subcontracts if we count 50% of subcontract one as labour-only. The value of the 
three subcontract packages – groundworks, brickwork and carpentry – exceeded 
£2m, 32% of total contract value (Table 3). The operative time input of these three 
subcontract packages, however, as we discovered in a detailed analysis of site 
diaries, was two-thirds of all operative time on site and the brickwork and 
groundwork subcontracts alone accounted for 57.3% of all operative input (Table 
4). The discrepancy between one-third of overall contract value as against two-
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thirds of operative input appears significant but reflects in part the amount of 
material supplied by the main contractor and the lower pay of the predominantly 
untrained labour employed on groundworks. The proportion of two-thirds of 
operative time input by a few subcontract firms is nevertheless dramatically high, 
resulting in the main contractor relying on two predominantly labour-only 
subcontract firms for well over half the labour deployed on site. With the 
exception of part of the groundwork, the main contractor supplied all material for 
these three subcontracts, though the fetching and handling of material was the task 
of the subcontractors. This system caused such problems that the main contractor 
employed its own storeperson on site to avoid material damage.  
Table 4 
 
Formal training relationships could hardly be sustained in this system of casual 
employment and the site diary records only 132 days of apprentice training and 
144 days for the management trainee of the main contractor. Learning on the job 
was instead predominantly informal, for instance, on groundworks, where the 
largest proportion of labourers or untrained operatives are generally to be found, 
representing on this site an estimated 80% of the time input in this area. The 
majority of the ‘skilled’ operatives of the groundwork subcontractor, the 
bricklayers, were classified as bricklayers in the site diary, leaving the figure for 
labourers’ work at 6,719 days or 30% of total operative input.  
 
A comparison of subcontracts on selected UK sites is given in Table 5. The 
proportion of subcontracted work varies between 44% and 69%, at a conservative 
estimate, as not all subcontracts were recorded. The high proportion of 
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subcontracting found on UK1 is, therefore, not unusual but rather typical as it is 
also found on UK2 and 4. Subcontractors generally are small contractors and 
therefore unable to carry out work on a large scale, let alone to invest in large 
plant and machinery. They also often act as labour-only subcontractors and tend 
to have a high labour turnover, thus operating with a high degree of 
unpredictability in terms of labour, quality and cost (Clarke and Wall 1998).  
Table 5 
 
On the German sites the situation was qualitatively different. On D1 there were 27 
subcontracts, but the total value of just six of these, £926m (2,778m DM), 
represented a considerable proportion of all subcontracts and 27% of the total 
contract sum (Table 6). These six firms were all specialist: a painting and 
rendering firm, a roofer, electrician, tiler, locksmith, and floor layer. Three of the 
subcontractors were larger specialist firms – the painting and rendering firm, the 
window manufacturer, and the roofing and external cladding specialist – with 50, 
70 and 40 direct employees and turnovers of £1.5m (4.5m DM), £3.3m (16m DM) 
and £2.8m (8.3m DM) respectively at the end of the 1990s. The seven smaller 
trade firms employed under 15 people and had turnovers under a million pounds. 
The screeding and floorlaying firm sub-subcontracted the work, the only instance 
on this contract where work was further sublet. All the specialist firms with the 
exception of the roofing contractor were in the finishing trades. The main 
contractor carried out the superstructure work with its own workforce. Therefore 
the nature of subcontracting differed markedly from the British cases in being 
associated with specialist firms directly employing mainly skilled operatives and 
operating on a supply-and-fix basis. 
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Table 6 
 
The value of the subcontracts on D1 ranged from £123,73337 (1,200 DM), the 
lowest, to £204,933 (614,800 DM), the highest, and four of the six contracts were 
between £130,000 and £160,000 (390,000 DM and 470,000 DM), representing a 
relatively narrow spread of subcontract values and a more balanced system of 
specialist trade subcontracting than was evident on the British sites.  
 
A more detailed analysis of the subcontract firms in the German case shows that 
13 firms (Table 7) carried out 6,167 days or 60.4% of all operative input; the 14 
other subcontracts only made up 5% or 515 days of operative input, covering a 
small part of the whole project. Three subcontracts had an operative input higher 
than 5%: external rendering at 9.3% of total operative input or 952 days and 
painting at 3% or 304 days totalling 12.3%; electrical works at 8.8% or 903 days; 
and internal plastering at 5.4% or 503 days.  
Table 7 
 
The services firms on D1 had a much larger share of operative input than that 
found for services in the UK. Heating and ventilating taken together had a 9.3% 
share of total operative input and electrical works 8.8% compared with the three 
UK projects, where the share of electrical works varied between 3% and 4% and 
plumbing input varied from the lowest at 4.2% on UK1 to about 7% on UK2 and 
UK5. 
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An analysis of the skill set of the subcontract gangs on the German site D1 shows 
the predominantly skilled labour employed by the nine specialist trade firms: in all 
43 operatives were employed, 25 skilled, including two former bricklayers-
turned-plasterers, one Meister and three forepersons (Table 6). There were also 11 
semi-skilled operatives or Fachwerker and seven trainees. Of a total of 25 skilled 
operatives, therefore, over a quarter were trainees, resulting in a high skill 
reproduction rate of 28%. This is higher than the national figure of trainee 
carpenters, bricklayers and concreters to skilled workers in the respective trades of 
18%, 21% and 27% on a five-year average from 1996-2000 (ZDB 1997-2002). It 
supports too the generally held view that small specialist trade firms in Germany 
carry out proportionally more training. However, of a total of 43 operatives, the 
11 semi-skilled Fachwerker represent a figure higher than the German macro 
figure for unskilled work of 22% in 2001 (ZDB 2002). 
 
As well as the level of skills employed, another key difference between UK1 and 
D1 lies in employment relations on site. On D1, the main contractor’s directly 
employed workforce were responsible for 3,523 operative days or 34.5% of total 
operative time, mostly on building the superstructure. The main contractor 
directly employed skilled operatives in the main trades – bricklayers, concretors 
and carpenters. Stability of employment on the German site contrasts sharply, 
therefore, with subcontracting on the UK sites. In effect what we observe is the 
predominance in Britain of contract relations or contracts of service compared 
with employment relations or contracts of employment in Germany (Deakin 
2000). 
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In summary, therefore, subcontracting differs dramatically, being very much less 
widespread in Germany than in the UK and of a qualitatively different nature. In 
our case study projects the subcontracted share of the main contract value in the 
UK, ranging between 44% and 69% (Table 5), was also significantly higher than 
in Germany, where on D1 it represented less than a third. But a key difference is 
that in Germany specialist subcontractors tend to be small and medium-sized 
firms, the larger of these having the resources and capacity to undertake large 
contracts, and are concentrated mostly in the finishing trades, such as the window 
and door manufacturer and installer and the roofing and cladding company on D1. 
Unlike in the UK, superstructure work on all four German projects was 
predominantly carried out by the main contractor and firms’ investment in 
training was substantial, as apparent on D1. 
 
Perhaps the most significant difference between subcontracting in the UK and 
Germany is labour-only-subcontracting. In being confined to the traditional 
trades, it tends to perpetuate the status quo and to fragment production knowledge 
through separating the control and responsibility for labour and materials 
(Hampshire County Council 2000). The value of materials supplied by the main 
contractor is often high, amounting on UK4 to 16% of the main contract value. 
The main contractor in effect manages and finances the material flow so as to 
control one of the most important aspects of project coordination and to reap the 
benefits of repeat bulk purchasing. But, in abdicating responsibility for the labour 
itself, the main contractor also loses control over improvements in productive 
efficiency, through, for instance, greater mechanisation. It is therefore no 
coincidence that in our study those activities under labour-only subcontractors 
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were found to be highly labour intensive, whilst in Germany in contrast they are 
carried out by the main contractors’ own directly-employed labour. 
 
The construction team  
 
The preoccupation with costs rather than the organisation of production in the 
British case, aptly symbolised by the degree of subcontracting on sites, also 
carries through and is reflected in the different nature of the construction team 
found on German and UK sites. In Germany, all our sites had a Bauleiter for the 
whole period of the contract. Bauleiter are building engineers who have 
completed a five- to six-year higher education degree course at a university or 
polytechnic. Bauleiter employed by contractors have overall project 
responsibility, but can also have hands-on involvement. On one German project 
the Bauleiter spent every morning on site, having discussions with subcontractors, 
supervising their work and working out the details of the next work stages jointly 
with the site manager, the Polier. The Bauleiter's normal range of tasks includes 
production, cost and technology, involving contract administration, contract 
programming, technical specification and the logistics of the project (the supply of 
material and plant), valuation and measuring as well as communicating with the 
client and architect. Bauleiter are usually site based, unless the projects are very 
small or they are responsible for more than one site; together with the Polier they 
form the site management team and represent an effective combination of 
professional and trade knowledge and experience. The Polier always has a trade 
background, having completed an apprenticeship and then undertaken either the 
lengthy and demanding course to qualify as a Geprüfter Polier or the course for a 
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Meister. The Polier also carries out various tasks of the UK site engineer and 
quantity surveyor.  
 
The D1 site of 68 units and 5,727 sq.m. was of sufficient size to have a resident 
engineer. The firm also had its own production personnel: there were 31 
operatives on site, including on average five trainees. On the professional side, the 
lack of specialist quantity surveying skills is striking. The cost and production 
function is integrated into the role of the Bauleiter, the building engineer, who has 
the central role in the construction team. Production management skills 
comprising programming, logistics and coordination of the project are part of the 
Bauleiter’s job profile, as well as the assessment of buildability and technical 
standards. Most importantly, the building engineer’s role, in cooperation with the 
Polier, also contains the quantity surveyor’s responsibilities for preparing 
valuations and measuring. Larger companies employ specialist commercial 
expertise at headquarter level, which is at the disposal of the divisions or regions, 
where building engineers cover the whole range of tasks of the UK professional 
staff, the contracts manager and quantity surveyor. The surveying or cost function 
is not nearly as pronounced as in the UK. The German production system is based 
on the principle that construction firms have their own productive capacity, 
directly employed operatives and plant. This means that less of a firm’s resources 
and effort are focused on costs than production; defining the optimum productive 
method becomes more important than looking for the lowest denominator of cost 
and quality. 
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In the UK, in contrast, the construction team exhibits a different division and 
configuration of skills in the office and in the deployment of skills between office 
and site. The typical skill set of a UK construction team comprises: estimator and 
surveyors, as the cost function pre- and post-contract; contracts manager/building 
or production manager as the production and contracts expert; material scheduler 
and buyer for the supply of material in time and on budget; and a Design-and-
Build manager for coordination of the design. 
 
In comparison with the occupational profile of the building engineer in Germany, 
the skill set in the UK is occupationally narrower and divided into more roles 
(Gann and Salter 1999). Resident engineers do not exist on UK housing sites; 
normally engineers are used as external consultants for structural calculations and 
for site setting out; none of our firms employed engineers directly with the 
exception of UK1, whose managing director has a civil engineering background. 
On one of our sites the subcontractor’s engineer was employed by a labour agency 
to do the setting out. In the German context this task is carried out by the Polier 
and not the engineer, even when resident. There is no German equivalent of the 
UK contracts manager, for whom two career routes are available, either through 
higher or further education courses or through the trade route. Some contracts 
managers have completed a Higher National Certificate or Diploma on top of a 
craft-based training. Younger contracts managers are likely to have completed a 
higher degree course in construction management, but due to their lack of trade 
background are often less involved in site operations. 
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The construction team in Germany and the UK thus differs in the number of 
different participants, their expertise and the demarcation of their tasks. In the UK 
the narrow definition of tasks and deeper division of labour inevitably lead to a 
higher degree of friction and conflict in labour and work organisation. This is 
exacerbated as none of the UK contractors in our sample any longer employs 
skilled operatives. The German contractors on the four case studies carried out the 
structural part of the work themselves. In the UK the loss of the construction 
firm’s operative base has far reaching implications for the main contractor-turned-
general-or-management- contractor, as site management was traditionally 
recruited from trade personnel. A firm that cuts off its own trade base has lost a 
natural recruiting ground and career progression for experienced site managers.  
 
The role of the cost expert 
Cost expertise is a fundamental skill for all firms. Yet only in the UK is there a 
specialist occupation, the quantity surveyor (Gann and Salter 1999). In Germany 
this function is incorporated into design and technology expertise, the architect 
and engineer respectively. Compared with these professions, quantity surveying 
education has a very limited technical base. An examination of a typical quantity 
surveying course, for instance, at an Inner-London University revealed the low 
proportion of 21% of technical content; out of a total of 24 modules (eight each at 
levels 1, 2 and 3), only five at levels 1 and 2 specifically deal with building 
technology, materials, ground conditions and environmental services technology. 
No technical expert was employed on our construction projects, in stark contrast 
to the projects in Germany, which all had engineers involved. A further problem 
pinpointed by Winch and Campagnac (1995) is that : 
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The employer’s agent or quantity surveyor … responsible for appraising tenders 
on behalf of the client … has no technical competence [and] is, therefore, not 
prepared to consider variations from the contractor … 
 
For the UK production system the separate quantity surveying cost function has 
created a deeper division of labour and accentuated the development of a cost-
focused system. An examination of the proportion of cost personnel to the overall 
employment of office staff in three of the UK firms, UK1, UK2 and UK3, showed 
that between 42-47% of all office staff were involved in the cost function, 
including in the estimating and buying departments. Excluding these departments, 
in two companies 34% and in a third 30%, that is on average one-third of all 
office staff were quantity surveyors (Table 8). It emerged from our case studies 
that the quantity surveyor has a strong presence on site. The key question is, if UK 
firms apportion more importance to the cost function than German firms, how 
does this influence the production process?  
Table 8 
 
A detailed examination of the division of tasks of the contractor’s quantity 
surveyor involved on the UK4 project showed that operations on this site, 
totalling 49% of their time input, demand their core skills: valuing 
instructions/variations, examining and valuing work executed for payment, and 
attending site and progress meetings. On another UK project 90% of the 
surveyors’ time input was comprised as follows: subletting subcontract packages, 
20%; examining and valuing work executed for payment, 40%; cost monitoring, 
20%; and value instructions and preparing valuations, 10%. The tender for this 
contract was on the basis of approximate quantities and therefore a lot of 
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remeasuring was required, apart from lump sum quantities such as the carpentry 
and joinery package.  
 
The conflict between surveying and production is well illustrated by an 
experienced project director with a trade background who spoke for the site 
production teams: 
The production team cannot change the buying. For instance, the fencing 
contractor was chosen by head office and the production side knew very well 
that the price was too low and the quality of the work awful. A similar case is 
the groundworks subcontractor; they are six weeks behind programme. The 
decision about the choice of subcontractors lies with the surveyors and all 
senior management has a quantity surveying background. In all my 13years 
with the company I have had a 'battle with the quantity surveyors'.  
 
This highlights a key area where the quantity surveyor has the final say: the 
subletting of subcontracts. These work packages are let entirely on the basis of 
cost. However, the preoccupation with cost may detract from technical and quality 
issues and the most efficient production process. Analysis of site diaries reveals 
the considerable time input on the cost side. On UK1, in 51 weeks or 241 
recorded days a junior quantity surveyor was 151 days on site and a senior one 
114 days, a total of 265 days of surveying input. The site management team’s time 
input, in contrast, totalled 592 days over the same period. Taken together these 
total 857 days, or a time input of 31% for cost expertise and 69% for site 
management.  
 
In Germany, in contrast, the cost function is integrated into technical expertise, 
making for an approach that considers a technically improved process to be at the 
same time cost effective. Technical innovation can lead to higher productivity and 
therefore achieve cost reduction. The German firm’s employment structure in 
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terms of technical and commercial staff is heavily weighted towards the technical 
side, with the engineer in a prominent position, reflecting the higher education 
system with the architect and engineer firmly in place as the two main 
occupations in the industry. The disaggregation of skills in the UK case illustrated 
in the examples of divisions between cost and production functions reveals the 
imbalance of a cost-driven production system, the detrimental effect of the tension 
and friction between cost and production, and the way in which the contractors’ 
primary concern with costs acts as a major deterrent to improving or restructuring 
the production process. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has shown how in the British case the concern to control costs and 
contract relations rather than to regulate production determines all aspects of the 
process, in particular the functions of the construction team, from the site manager 
and foreperson to the building engineer and architect. This is reflected in the 
substantial differences found in the input of production expertise and knowledge. 
In Germany, the high input of production expertise is evident from the extended 
functions of the building engineer and the architect. In Britain, nowhere is the 
predominance of cost more evident than in the role of the quantity surveyor, 
which with increased subcontracting has expanded rapidly, whilst knowledge of 
the production process has diminished, as evidenced by the limited or non-existent 
role of the building engineer. This results in a highly fragmented process where 
the control of materials and labour is separate and the level of investment is low, 
whether in labour through training or in machinery and equipment. This, in turn, 
is reflected in the structure of firms, with the majority of construction workers in 
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Britain increasingly employed in small firms, with their low investment and 
capacity, whilst in Germany the majority are employed in medium-sized firms. 
Our findings suggest that in order to transform the housebuilding process, 
investment in skills to enhance engineering and production expertise together with 
a regulated and stable employment relation offers a clear alternative to tinkering 
with contract relations and cost reductions. 
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Table 1 Proportion of office to production employees 1999/2000 
 
Firm UK1 D1 
Turnover group £95m in 1998 £292m (875m DM) 
Total No. of employees in group 876  2,795  
Turnover per employee £108,333 £104,353 (313,059 DM) 
Turnover in housing firm £59.5m  £30m (90m DM) 
Total No. of employees in housing 478  257 
Turnover per employee in housing £124,477 £118,732 (350,195 DM) 
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Table 2  Proportion of office to production employees 
 
 
 
Firms 
 
Total 
employees 
 
Office 
personnel 
Office as % of 
total 
employees 
 
Production 
personnel 
Production as 
% of total 
employees 
D1 269 41 15  228 85  
D2 132 28 21   104 79  
UK 1 478 113 24  365 76  
UK 2 81 51 63  30 37  
UK 4 86 54 63  32 37  
UK 5 169 98 58  71 42  
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Figure 1 UK contractor: UK1 
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Figure 2 The German contractor: D1, a regional division 
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Table 3  Subcontracting on UK1 
 
 
Sub-
contractor 
 
Trade 
Turnover 
2000 
in £ million 
Total 
employees 
2000 
Subcontract 
value 
In £  
Subcontract 
value as % of 
contract value
Groundworks 
Plumbing and drainage 
External works 
 
1.052,500 
 
 
1 
Brickwork (groundwork and 
external work) 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
362,471 
 
 
22.3 
2 Specialist piling contractor 63.9 685 220,000 3.5 
3 Scaffolding n.a. n.a. 46,500 0.7 
4 Brickwork 3.9 n.a. 507,000 8 
5 Roofing n.a. n.a.  90,000 1.4 
6 Plumbing/ heating  n.a. n.a.  331,000 5.2 
7 Electrical n.a. n.a.  167,000 2.6 
8 Plastering/ screeding n.a. n.a. 216,000 3.4 
9 Carpentry  n.a. n.a. 110,000 1.7 
10 Decorating n.a. n.a. 68,000 1.1 
11 Insulation n.a. n.a. 36,000 0.6 
12 Fencing n.a. n.a. 35,500 0.6 
13 Landscaping n.a. n.a. 68,000 1.1 
14 Flooring n.a. n.a. 28,500 0.4 
15 Tiling n.a. n.a. 28,000 0.4 
16 Paving n.a. n.a. 5,100 0.1 
 Total subcontract values   3.371,571 53 
 Total contract value    6.348,173 100 
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Table 4 Operative input of subcontracting firms on UK11 
 
 
Sub-
contractor 
 
Trade 
Operatives on site, 
team on site 
(peaks) 
 
Total number of 
days 
 
% of operative 
input 
Groundworks 
Plumbing and drainage 
External works 
16 operatives 
(with peaks of  
30) 
 
5301 
 
23.9 
 
1 
Brickwork (groundwork and 
external works) 
2 Brickwork 
 
24 (30) 
 
7295 
 
33 
3 Specialist piling contractor 2  257 1.2 
4 Scaffolding 2 384 1.7 
5 Roofing 2 388 1.87 
6 Plumbing/ heating  4 890 4 
7 Electrical 4 719 3.2 
8 Plastering/ screeding (14) 1604 7.2 
9 Carpentry  (15) 2127 9.6 
10 Decorating (9) 744 3.4 
11 Insulation 2 47 0.2 
12 Fencing 2 356 1.6 
13 Landscaping 2 100 0.5 
14 Flooring 3 146 0.7 
15 Tiling 1 148 0.7 
 Others (storeman, forklift 
driver, cleaning etc) 
 1555 7 
 Trainees 1 132 0.6 
 Total operative input  22193 100 
 
1. The list follows the system of recording in the site diary, which listed the functions and work 
stages not firms or occupations. 
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Table 5 Subcontracts on selected UK case studies 
 
  
 
Contract 
value 
 
Total 
subcontract 
value1 
 
Proportion of total 
subcontract to total 
contract value 
Proportion of 
largest subcontract 
to total contract 
value 
 
Total number 
of subcontract 
packages 
UK1 £6.3m  £3.4 m 54% 22% 16 
UK2 £3.6 m  £1.77 m 44% 12% 22 
UK4 £6.66 m £4.3 m 64% 13% 19 
1. Complete subcontract values could only be recorded on UK4. 
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Table 6 Subcontract firms on D1 
 
 
 
Sub-
contractor 
 
 
Trade 
Turnover 
1999 
in £ million 
(DM) 
 
Total 
employees 
1999 
 
Subcontract 
value 
In £ (DM) 
Subcontract 
value as % of 
contract 
value 
External insulation and 
render 
154,667 
(464,000) 
4.6  
1 
 Painting 
 
1.5 (4.5)  
 
 
50 
 30,933 
(92,800) 
0.9 
2 Electrics 0.83 (2.5) 15 123,733 
(371,200) 
3.6 
3 Plastering 0.4 (1.2) 8 NA  
4 Ventilation and sanitary  NA 12 NA  
5 Heating 0.5 (1.5)  8 NA  
6 Screeding and floor layer 
2 sub-subcontractors 
1.33 (4)  0 131,467 
(394,400) 
3.9 
7 Window manufacturer, 
doors, metal works  
5.3 (16)  70   
8 Tiling 0.83 (2.5)  15 135,333 
(406,000) 
4 
9 Roofing,  
 
external cladding 
 
2.8 (8.3) 
 
40 
94,733 
(284,200) 
50,267 
(150,800) 
2.8 
 
1.5 
10 Locksmith and ironworks 0.6 (1.8) 15 204,933 
(614,800) 
6 
 Total subcontract values   926,067 
(2,778,200) 
27.3 
 Total contract value    3.397,986 
(10,193,958) 
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Table 7 Operative input of subcontracting firms on D1 
 
 
Sub-
contractor 
 
Trade 
Operatives on site, 
team on site 
Total 
number 
of days 
% of operative 
input 
External insulation and 
render 
 
952 
 
9.3 
 
1 
Painting 
1 master painter, 2 foreperson, 3 
skilled, 5 labourer/semi-skilled 
1 trainee 304 3 
2 Electrics 4 skilled electricians, 1 trainee 903 8.8 
3 Plastering 2 skilled plasterers, 2 semi-killed 
(former bricklayers) 
 
549 
 
5.4 
4 Ventilation 
and sanitary 
2 skilled gas water plumbers 
1 labourer, 1 trainee 
 
503 
 
4.9 
5 Heating 1 foreperson, 1 skilled heating 
engineer, 1 labourer, 1 trainee 
 
444 
 
4.4 
6 Screeding and floor layer 
2 sub-subcontractors 
2 sub-subcontractors, screeder and 
floorlayer 
 
427 
 
4.2 
7 Window manufacturer, 
doors, metal works 
3 skilled, 1 Fachwerker 
(joiner and locksmith) 
420 4.1 
8 Tiling 2 skilled tilers, 1 trainee 325 3.2 
9 Roofing, external 
cladding 
2 skilled roofers, 1 trainee,  
1 semi-skilled 
314 3.1 
10 Schlosser 2 skilled metalworker, 1 trainee 238 2.3 
11 Scaffolding  173 1.7 
12 Doors and locksmith  123 1.2 
13 External works  492 4.8 
  13 trade specialist firm 6,167 60.40 
  Total subcontractor input  6,682 65.4 
  Total operative input  10,205  
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Table 8 Cost personnel in three UK construction companies 
 
 
 
 
 
UK1 
 
UK2 
 
UK4 
Cost personnel as % 
of office staff 
 
47% 
 
45% 
 
42% 
Quantity surveying as 
% of office staff 
 
34% 
 
34% 
 
30% 
Office staff as % of 
total staff 
 
24% 
 
54% 
 
61% 
 
